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Abstract
We analyze the design of international environmental agreement
(IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. In stage one, a
designer chooses an IEA rule which, depending on the coalition of sig-
natories formed in stage two, specifies the action that each signatory
should take in stage three. A certain degree of participation uncer-
tainty exists in that each country intending to sign the IEA for its
best interest has a probability to end up a non-signatory. An IEA
rule is said to be optimal if it maximizes the expected payoff of each
signatory. We provide an algorithm to determine an optimal rule, and
show its advantage over some rules used in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The increasing emission of transboundary pollution has threatened the hu-
man society from many aspects. For a country, reducing the emission of a
global pollutant can be regarded as providing a public good benefiting the
whole world. However, voluntary abatement of the pollutant is typically not
sufficient, because countries have incentives to free ride on the abatement
effort of other countries. One possible method to overcome this problem is
to form a coalition wherein the members sign a self-enforcing international
environmental agreement (IEA) and follow certain abatement rules.
The formation of such a coalition is sometimes modeled as a two-stage
open membership game played by some self-interested countries.1 In stage
one (participation stage), each country decides whether to join the coalition
and sign the IEA. In stage two (abatement stage), the signatories follow given
rules of the IEA, while each non-signatory decides its own action.
Unfortunately, it is reported that IEAs do not always work very well. The
welfare improvements created by IEAs are typically not as significant as one
might expect, both in theory and in practice. For instance, Barrett (1994)
suggests that “... an IEA may achieve a high degree of cooperation, but only
when the difference between global net benefits under the noncooperative and
full cooperative outcomes is small”. Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) report
that “Most empirical work ... finding that IEAs result in no improvements
beyond what would have occurred in their absence”. There could be many
reasons for the failure of IEAs, but in this paper, we focus on the following
two of them.2
One reason is the existence of participation uncertainty: a country ini-
tially intending to sign the IEA for its own interest has a chance to make
a mistake and end up a non-signatory. Here, making a mistake means be-
having irrationally: the country does not sign the IEA even though signing
1See Finus (2001) and Carraro (2003) for some reviews.
2Many other reasons have been discussed in the literature, such as failing to realize
or be uncertain about the fact that under some conditions climate damages could shift
to a significantly larger value (Barrett, 2013; Nkuiya et al., 2015), using inappropriate
forms or parameters for payoff functions (Karp and Simon, 2013), and omitting the R&D
cooperation in adaption to climate change (Masoudi and Zaccour, 2017).
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is a better choice for it. This uncertainty, which makes it more difficult to
form a large coalition and achieve an efficient outcome, may be due to some
political reasons. For example, ratification of the IEA may be prevented by
some interest groups (Ko¨ke and Lange, 2017).
In this paper, the participation uncertainty is assumed to be one-way.
That is, we assume that only countries intend to sign the IEA may make
mistakes, while the probability that a country not intending to sign the IEA
becomes a signatory, which rarely happens in reality, is zero. In fact, there
may not exist a stable coalition if uncertainty in both directions can happen.3
In the IEA literature, there are several other types of risk or uncertainty,
such as uncertainty about the payoff functions (Kolstad, 2007; Dellink et al.,
2008; Nkuiya et al., 2015; Meya et al., 2017), uncertainty about the threshold
that triggers climate catastrophe (Barrett, 2013), and uncertainty about the
realization of other players’ mixed strategies (Hong and Karp, 2014). To keep
analysis simple, in this paper we omit all these kinds of uncertainty, and focus
on participation uncertainty only. In reality, participation uncertainty has
drawn much attention since the recent withdraw of the United States from
the Paris Agreement. In theory, this type of uncertainty turns out to be a
key factor in determining what a “good” IEA looks like.4
Several recent studies have discussed the political backgrounds behind
participation uncertainty. For example, Ko¨ke and Lange (2017) analyze the
ratification process of an IEA by introducing public choice approach into the
model. They assume that the preference of the agent who is responsible for
the ratification of IEA is subject to uncertainty, leading to a possibility of
ratification failure. Cazals and Sauquet (2015) suggest that the ratification
probability of a country may depend on whether it is a developed country or
a developing one, and whether leaders have incentive to postpone the ratifi-
cation. By contrast, in this paper we ignore the detailed political reason or
process that creates the uncertainty, and simply introduce a given parameter
3The introduction of one-way uncertainty has already imposed enough restrictions on
the stability of coalitions such that there exists a unique stable size of coalition (See
Proposition 1 in section 3). Additional restrictions from two-way uncertainty will generally
be too strong for a stable coalition to exist.
4See the uncertainty effect in section 5 of this paper.
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to be the exogenous probability with which each cooperating country will
not become a signatory.
A second reason of why IEAs are not so successful is, the IEA rules
used in some early works are exogenously given and may not be justified
as appropriate ones. Notably, a large body of studies5 assume that in the
abatement stage, given any coalition of signatories that has already been
formed, all signatories should coordinate their actions and maximize the joint
payoffs of this coalition. We call this rule the maximizing total payoff (MTP)
rule. Meanwhile, some other studies6 apply the coalition unanimity (CU)
rule, which requires participation of all countries for an IEA to be effective. In
section 5, we will show that generally both the MTP rule and the CU rule are
not “optimal” in the presence of participation uncertainty.7 Briefly speaking,
the MTP rule is more robust against the aforementioned uncertainty, but may
provide insufficient incentives for cooperation. By contrast, although the CU
rule provides large participation incentives, it suffers a lot from uncertainty.
Some other rules used in the literature are combinations or extensions of the
MTP rule and/or the CU rule, and will be discussed in section 5.
In order to overcome the problem raised by exogenous IEA rules, several
studies have analyzed the endogenous determination of the IEA rules from
some specific aspects, allowing one to choose a rule among a certain set
of feasible rules. Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008) compare the MTP rule
with three other rules that involving abatement quotas. Finus and Maus
(2008) assume that signatories consider only a fraction α of damages and
endogenously determine the optimal value of α. Carraro et al. (2009) discuss
the MTP rule with an additional restriction of minimal participation; here,
the threshold of forming the coalition is endogenously determined. Ko¨ke and
Lange (2017) consider an endogenous rule that simultaneously determine
the threshold of cooperation and the signatories’ abatement level. However,
these studies analyze only certain special cases of endogenous rules and hence
cannot be considered fully general.
5Usually called noncooperative approach. See, among others, Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993), and Barrett (1994).
6Sometimes called cooperative approach. See Chander and Tulkens (1997) for example.
7The formal definition of optimal rule will be given in section 4.
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Following the above literature, the main purpose of this study is to extend
the traditional IEA formation model to allow for participation uncertainty
and more general IEA rules where the required abatement level for each signa-
tory is fully contingent on the number of signatories. We hope this extension
will help us design a better IEA rule than those used in the literature.
To this end, we employ a three-stage coalition formation game under the
setting of symmetric countries. In stage one (designing stage), a designer8
launches a coalition and announces an IEA rule, which is a function speci-
fying the abatement level of each signatory for every possible cardinality of
the coalition of signatories formed in stage two. The designer’s goal is to
maximize the expected payoff of each signatory. In stage two (participation
stage), each country can independently choose whether to cooperate or to
free ride. There exists a one-way participation uncertainty in this stage so
that each cooperator has probability ε ≥ 0 to end up a non-signatory and
probability 1−ε to be a signatory, while each free rider will definitely become
a non-signatory. Stage three is the usual abatement stage that determines
each country’s abatement level and payoff.
Compared to traditional IEA formation models, our model has the fol-
lowing features. First, the class of rules we study are very general in the
sense that the assigned actions for signatories are fully contingent on the
number of signatories. In particular, this type of rules are flexible enough to
incorporate many commonly used rules as special cases, some of which will
be discussed in section 5. Of course, more general rules are possible if we
study more general model settings such as asymmetric players, but they are
beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, the rule is endogenously chosen by the designer. Since the de-
signer is the initiator of the coalition, it is quite natural to assume that he/she
does not care about the interests of non-signatories so as to discourage free-
riding behavior. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume the designer’s goal
is to maximize the expected payoff of signatories. Another justification of
this assumption is that it guarantees that the coalition of signatories formed
8The designer can be a set of countries or an independent organization, for example,
the United Nations.
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in stage two is renegotiation-proof. That is, once this coalition is formed un-
der the rule based on above goal, the signatories will not unanimously agree
on replacing this rule by a new rule such as the MTP rule. Otherwise, the
coalition that is expected to form under the new rule will change accordingly,
leading to a smaller (at least not larger) expected payoff of each signatory.
Third, the setting of endogenously determined rules and the presence of
participation uncertainty would largely increase the analytical complexity of
the model. So we have to keep other aspects of our model as simple as possible
to make it tractable and to illustrate the main idea in a more transparent
manner. Specifically, we assume that all countries are ex ante symmetry, that
the game is one-shot instead of dynamic, that the pollutant is a flow rather
than a stock, and that the benefit function is linear while the cost function
is quadratic. Although these simplified assumptions have been used in the
IEA literature somewhere or other9, some of them are surely not realistic and
cannot be directly applied to design an IEA rule in real world. For instance,
the linear benefit function results in a dominant abatement level for each
non-signatory, which greatly simplify our analysis; however, it also makes
this model difficult to capture the issue linkage prevails among countries.
Nevertheless, starting from this basic model, some more complicated and
more realistic situations can be left for future studies.
The internal and external stability concept introduced by d’Aspremont
et al. (1983) has been widely applied in coalition formation literature for an-
ticipating which coalition will be formed in the participation stage. However,
there are two important reasons why this stability concept is not appropri-
ate for our model. First, internally and externally stable coalitions are not
necessarily unique. Thus, in the first stage of the game, the designer is typi-
cally not able to determine the precise payoff outcome associated with each
certain rule, and consequently has difficulty in comparing different rules.
Second, the existence of participation uncertainty makes it more difficult to
determine the coalition formed in participation stage. Specifically, even if
a coalition is internally and externally stable, it can still be vulnerable to
9Especially when the model involves uncertainty. For example, see Kolstad (2007) and
Ko¨ke and Lange (2017).
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deviation after some degree of uncertainty is realized10. Luckily, we find a
stronger version of stability concept, namely ex ante and ex post stability,
that overcomes both issues. Simply put, a coalition is ex ante and ex post
stable if no country will change its decision both before and after any degree
of uncertainty is realized. In addition, ex ante and ex post stable coalition is
essentially unique under any IEA rule.
By using this stability concept, we can solve the three-stage IEA forma-
tion game by backward induction. We prove that given any IEA rule, the size
of stable coalitions can be uniquely determined (Proposition 1). Therefore,
a unique value of the designer’s objective can be associated with each IEA
rule. Furthermore, we provide an algorithm to derive a rule which maximizes
the above objective (Theorem 1), and name it optimal rule11. Thus, we can
determine the size of the coalition of countries that choose to cooperate in
stage two, and the rule that the designer announces in stage one.
To illustrate the difference between the optimal rule and some rules used
in the literature, a numerical example is discussed. This example shows that
the MTP rule, the CU rule, and some other rules are all not optimal for
the designer in general. Moreover, we provide some conditions under which
these rules are optimal or almost optimal (Proposition 3, Proposition 4), and
explain the intuition behind these outcomes. In short, the optimal rule could
be better than other rules mainly because it is more flexible and thus can be
more appropriately designed when facing the tradeoff between two conflicting
purposes: punishing free-riding behavior and reducing uncertainty cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the setup of the model and the three-stage coalition formation game. We
introduce ex ante and ex post stability to solve this game in section 3, and
derive an optimal IEA rule in section 4. Several special IEA rules are dis-
cussed and compared with the optimal rule in section 5. Finally, section 6
concludes the paper.
10See section 3 for more detailed explanation on this issue.
11Of course, it is only optimal within the class of rules we discussed.
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2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of homogeneous countries, where n ≥ 2.
There is a perfectly divisible good with negative externalities, for example,
a pollutant. Let xi denote country i’s abatement level of the good and let
x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an abatement combination.
Given x, country i’s payoff is
ui(x) = λ
∑
j∈N
xj − 1
2
x2i , (1)
where λ > 0 is the common marginal benefit from total abatement
∑
j∈N xj
due to negative externalities of the good, and x2i /2 is country i’s individual
abatement cost. Assume that payoffs are transferable, and the social welfare
is the total payoffs of all countries:
U(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(x) = nλ
∑
i∈N
xi −
∑
i∈N
x2i
2
.
An abatement combination x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is said to be socially optimal
if it maximizes social welfare. The first-order conditions ∂U(x)/∂xi = 0 yield
x∗i = nλ, ∀i ∈ N. (2)
On the other hand, if each country i chooses xi to maximize its own pay-
off ui given the other countries’ abatement levels, the first-order conditions
∂ui(x)/∂xi = 0 lead to
x0i = λ, ∀i ∈ N. (3)
Note that x0i is a dominant abatement level of i, regardless of other countries’
actions. From this, it follows that x0 = (x01, . . . , x
0
n) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of this non-cooperative abatement game.
Since x∗i > x
0
i , the world suffers from too much emission of the good. This
is a commonly known social dilemma due to free rider problem. One possible
method to overcome this problem is to form a coalition that regulates the
countries’ actions by a self-enforcing IEA. The formation of the coalition and
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the determination of the IEA rule follows a three-stage game.
• Stage one. A designer announces an IEA rule, which is a function e(·)
assigning a real value e(m) ≥ 0 to each integer m ∈ [1, n], where m
is the cardinality of the coalition of signatories M that will be formed
in stage two. We shall see that e(m) is indeed the required abatement
level for each signatory.12 A rule e(·) can also be denoted by a vector
e =
(
e(1), . . . , e(n)
) ∈ Rn+. Let R denote the set of all rules.
• Stage two. All countries in N simultaneously decide whether to be a co-
operator and intend to sign the IEA, or to be a free rider and determine
not to sign. Let M denote the set of cooperators, and let m = |M |
denote its cardinality. However, there is a one-way uncertainty with
regard to each cooperator’s final participation decision. Specifically,
a cooperator i ∈ M will make a mistake and end up a non-signatory
with probability ε, and become a signatory with probability 1 − ε,
where 0 ≤ ε < 1 is exogenously given. However, each free rider j /∈M
never makes a mistake and would certainly become a non-signatory.
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship of these types of countries. Let
M denote the set of signatories, and m = |M | be its cardinality. M is
obviously a subset of M , and hence m ≤ m. Given m and ε ∈ (0, 1),
m follows a binomial distribution so that the probability that m = k is
b(k;m, 1− ε) = m!
k!(m− k)!ε
m−k(1− ε)k, ∀k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (4)
Additionally, if ε = 0, then b(m;m, 1) = 1, b(k;m, 1) = 0, ∀k < m.
• Stage three. Given rule e and coalition M , each signatory i ∈ M
carries out its abatement xi = e(m) according to rule e, while each
non-signatory j /∈M chooses its dominant abatement level xj = λ. All
countries receive their respective payoffs.
Note that a rule e(·) is defined on the number of signatories m, rather
than on the number of cooperators m. This is because whether a country
12Due to symmetry, e(m) is the same for all signatories, and only depends on m.
9
cooperator
free rider
signatory
non-signatory
Pr = ε
Pr = 1− ε
Pr = 1
Figure 1: The relations of players
is a signatory or non-signatory is observable, but whether it has chosen to
cooperate or to free ride is its own subjective decision and cannot be directly
observed by others — this can only be deduced by comparing this country’s
expected payoffs involving different choices. If a non-signatory is better off
cooperating than free-riding, then it should have chosen to be a cooperator,
but somehow makes a mistake due to some political reasons, as addressed in
the introduction. In sum, the unobservable set M only depends on countries’
subjective choices13, while the observable set M depends on countries’ choices
as well as the realization of uncertainty.
Now, let G(n, λ, ε) denote the above three-stage game. Assume that
each country is risk neutral and chooses its action (cooperate or free ride)
to maximize its expected payoff. In particular, a country will choose to
cooperate if it is indifferent between cooperating and free riding. Meanwhile,
because of the reasons addressed in the introduction, we assume that the
designer will choose a rule to maximize the (identical) expected payoff of
each signatory.
3 Stable coalition
We can solve game G(n, λ, ε) by backward induction. Consider stage three
first. Given e and m, let X(m, e) = me(m) + (n − m)λ denote the total
13Nevertheless, we will show in Proposition 1 that essentially a stable M can be uniquely
determined for each rule e.
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abatement of all countries. Now, a non-signatory’s payoff is
uI(m, e) = λX(m, e)− λ
2
2
, if m < n, (5)
and a signatory’s payoff is
uC(m, e) = λX(m, e)− e(m)
2
2
, if m ≥ 1. (6)
Additionally, when no country signs the IEA, define
uC(0, e) = ui(x
0) =
(
n− 1
2
)
λ2, (7)
so that uC(m, e) is well-defined for all m ∈ [0, n]. This will be helpful in
defining (15).
Now we study stage two of G(n, λ, ε). Given e and m, consider the
expected payoff of a cooperator i ∈ M . With probability b(k;m − 1, 1 − ε)
there will be k signatories among all m − 1 cooperators other than i. In
this case, country i itself has probability ε to be a non-signatory and get
payoff uI(k, e), and has probability 1 − ε to be a signatory and get payoff
uC(k + 1, e). Therefore, each cooperator’s expected payoff is
uC(m, e) =
m−1∑
k=0
b(k;m− 1, 1− ε) [εuI(k, e) + (1− ε)uC(k + 1, e)] . (8)
Similarly, each free rider’s expected payoff is
uI(m, e) =
m∑
k=0
b(k;m, 1− ε)uI(k, e). (9)
We use the concept of stable coalition to predict which countries choose
to cooperate in stage two. We will see that it is a stronger version of the
internally and externally stability concept introduced by d’Aspremont et al.
(1983). Roughly speaking, a coalition M is stable if the countries in M are
the only ones choosing to cooperate before any uncertainty is realized (ex
ante stable), and the cooperators would not change their decisions even after
11
some degree of uncertainty is realized (ex post stable).
Formally, coalition M is said to be ex ante stable relative to e if no country
i ∈ M is willing to unilaterally leave M (internally stable) and no country
j /∈M is willing to unilaterally join M (externally stable) before uncertainty
is realized. Hence, a coalition M /∈ {∅, N} is ex ante stable relative to e if
uC(m, e) ≥ uI(m− 1, e), uC(m+ 1, e) < uI(m, e). (10)
In addition, M = ∅ is ex ante stable relative to e if uC(1, e) < uI(0, e), while
M = N is ex ante stable relative to e if uC(n, e) ≥ uI(n− 1, e).
When there is no participation uncertainty, ex ante stability is identical to
internal and external stability and is sufficient to identify the cooperator set
M . However, the existence of participation uncertainty makes things more
complex. For instance, suppose M is an ex ante stable coalition relative to e.
After realizing that some other cooperators have become non-signatories14,
a cooperator may regret for its former decision and choose to leave M .15 In
other words, being ex ante stable only suggests that the coalition is stable
before any uncertainty is realized, but this does not guarantee that the coali-
tion will remain stable after some degree of uncertainty is realized. This leads
to the ex post stability concept defined below.
A coalition M 6= ∅ is said to be ex post stable relative to e if, no matter
how many (at least one) cooperators have become non-signatories, no other
country will change its decision from cooperating to free riding under e.16
That is,
uC(s, e) ≥ uI(s− 1, e), ∀s ∈ [1,m− 1], (11)
where s is the number of cooperators that have not made mistakes yet. In
addition, M = ∅ is trivially defined to be ex post stable relative to any rule.
Finally, M is said to be stable relative to e if it is both ex ante and ex
post stable relative to e. Ultimately, a stable coalition will not provide any
14That is, M is a proper subset of M .
15For example, after the United States quits the Paris agreement, China may also con-
sider whether or not to quit.
16Although each cooperator still has a change to make a mistake.
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incentive for any country to change its decision regarding participation under
any circumstance. In sum, we have:
(a) M = ∅ is stable relative to e, if and only if
uC(1, e) < uI(0, e); (12)
(b) M /∈ {∅, N} is stable relative to e, if and only if
uC(m+ 1, e) < uI(m, e), uC(s, e) ≥ uI(s− 1, e), ∀s ∈ [1,m]; (13)
(c) M = N is stable relative to e, if and only if
uC(s, e) ≥ uI(s− 1, e), ∀s ∈ [1, n]. (14)
Because of the symmetry of countries, whether a coalition M is stable
relative to rule e depends only on its cardinality m. If a coalition M is stable
relative to e, then we say that m is a stable size relative to e. Similarly, if
M is ex ante (ex post) stable relative to e, then m is said to be an ex ante
(ex post) stable size relative to e.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of sta-
ble size relative to any given rule. Given the symmetry of countries, the
uniqueness of stable size implies that all stable coalitions are essentially
identical. Let m(e) denote this unique stable size relative to e. Thus, if
the designer announces rule e in stage one, then in stage two there will be
m(e) cooperators. In the proof, we will provide an algorithm to derive m(e),
and show that m(e) is exactly the smallest ex ante stable size for each e.
Proposition 1. There is a unique stable size m(e) relative to each rule e.
Proof. First, we prove that there exists at most one stable size relative to any
e. Assume that both m1 and m2 are ex ante stable sizes relative to e, where
m1 < m2. We only need to show that m2 cannot be an ex post stable size,
and thus cannot be a stable size, relative to e. Assume for a contradiction
that m2 is an ex post stable size relative to e. Then according to (11), we
have uC(m1 + 1, e) ≥ uI(m1, e) since m1 < m2. However, this contradicts
13
the assumption that m1 is an ex ante stable size relative to e, due to (10).
Therefore, we have proved that there exists at most one stable size m(e), and
if it exists, m(e) must be the smallest ex ante stable sizes relative to e.
Now we show that the stable size m(e) always exists for each e, using a
method introduced by d’Aspremont et al. (1983). If uC(1, e) < uI(0, e), then
we find a stable sizem(e) = 0 according to (12); otherwise, we have uC(1, e) ≥
uI(0, e). Furthermore, if uC(2, e) < uI(1, e), then stable size is m(e) = 1
according to (13); otherwise, we have uC(1, e) ≥ uI(0, e), uC(2, e) ≥ uI(1, e).
Proceeding in this manner, we shall either find a stable size m(e) < n, or
eventually have uC(k, e) ≥ uI(k− 1, e), k = 1, 2, . . . , n, which imply that the
stable size is m(e) = n according to (14).
Given e ∈ R, let EuC(e) denote the expected payoff of a signatory from
the viewpoint of the designer in stage one. Since there are m(e) cooperators,
the probability that there exist exactly k signatories is b
(
k;m(e), 1 − ε) for
any k ≤ m(e). Thus, we have
EuC(e) =
m(e)∑
k=0
b
(
k;m(e), 1− ε)uC(k, e). (15)
Recall that from (7), when there is no signatory (m = 0), the designer will
take a non-signatory’s payoff as a substitute for a signatory’s payoff. We make
this trivial assumption only to ensure that EuC(e) is always well-defined, even
though it is possible that M = ∅.
4 Optimal rule
Now, consider stage one of G(n, λ, ε). The objective of the designer in this
stage is to maximize EuC(e) by choosing rule e. If a rule e exists such that
EuC(e) ≥ EuC(e′) for all e′ ∈ R, then we say that e is optimal. We let R∗
denote the set of optimal rules, and let Eu∗ be the maximal value of EuC(e)
if R∗ is not empty. That is, Eu∗ = EuC(e∗) where e∗ ∈ R∗.
For s ∈ [0, n], let R(s) = {e ∈ R |m(e) = s} denote the set of rules
relative to whom the stable sizes are s. A rule e ∈ R(s) is said to be locally
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optimal at s, if e is optimal within R(s), that is, EuC(e) ≥ EuC(e′) for all
e′ ∈ R(s).
The following theorem establishes the existence of optimal rule.
Theorem 1. For any game G(n, λ, ε), there exists an optimal rule e∗.
Proof. First, we try to find a locally optimal rule e∗s at each s ∈ [0, n]. It is
easy to verify that e∗0 = (nλ, . . . , nλ) is locally optimal at s = 0. To find a
locally optimal rule at s ∈ [1, n], define
R(s) =
{(
e(1), . . . , e(s)
) ∈ Rs+ |uC(k, e) ≥ uI(k − 1, e), ∀k ∈ [1, s]}. (16)
We prove the following lemma in the appendix.
Lemma 1. For each s ∈ [1, n], R(s) is a non-empty bounded closed set.
Note that
∑s
k=0 b
(
k; s, 1− ε)uC(k, e) only depends on, and is continuous
in,
(
e(1), . . . , e(s)
)
. From Lemma 1, there exists a vector
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
)
that solves the following constrained optimization problem:
max
(e(1),...,e(s))∈R(s)
s∑
k=0
b
(
k; s, 1− ε)uC(k, e). (17)
We can derive this vector by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
For s = n, it is obvious that (e∗n(1), . . . , e
∗
n(n)) := e
∗
n ∈ R(n). For s ∈
[1, n− 1], we can find a vector (e∗s(s+ 1), . . . , e∗s(n)), which can be combined
with
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
)
to get e∗s :=
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(n)
)
. From (6) and (8), as
long as e∗s(s + 1) is sufficiently large, u
C(s + 1, e∗s) will be small enough so
that uC(s+1, e∗s) < u
I(s, e∗s). Since
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
) ∈ R(s), uC(s+1, e∗s) <
uI(s, e∗s), we have e
∗
s ∈ R(s).
Now, we shall show that e∗s is locally optimal at s. Suppose, on the
contrary, that there exists e′ ∈ R(s) such that EuC(e′) > EuC(e∗s). Then,∑s
k=0 b
(
k; s, 1 − ε)uC(k, e′) > ∑sk=0 b(k; s, 1 − ε)uC(k, e∗s). But this contra-
dicts
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
) ∈ arg max(e(1),...,e(s))∈R(s)∑sk=0 b(k; s, 1− ε)uC(k, e).
In sum, we have proved that for any s ∈ [0, n], there exists a rule e∗s that
is locally optimal at s. Thus, EuC(e∗s) = maxe∈R(s)Eu
C(e).
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Finally, we can easily find a rule e∗ in the set {e∗0, e∗1, . . . , e∗n} such that
EuC(e∗) = max{EuC(e∗0), EuC(e∗1), . . . , EuC(e∗n)}. (18)
It is easy to show that e∗ is an optimal rule. Suppose for a contradiction
that there exists e′ such that EuC(e′) > EuC(e∗), and e′ ∈ R(s). Then, from
(18), it follows that EuC(e∗) ≥ EuC(e∗s) ≥ EuC(e′), which contradicts the
assumption EuC(e′) > EuC(e∗). This ends the proof of the theorem.
The proof of Theorem 1 suggests a two-step algorithm to construct an
optimal rule. First, find a locally optimal rule e∗s at each s ∈ [0, n] mainly by
solving the constrained optimization problem (17). Then, among all these
locally optimal rules pick an optimal rule e∗ by (18).
Table 1: Locally optimal rules e∗s for G(5, 2, 0.1)
s e∗s EuC(e∗s)
0 (10, 10, 10, 10, 10) 18
1 (2, 10, 10, 10, 10) 18
2 (2, 4, 10, 10, 10) 19.62
3 (2, 4, 6, 10, 10) 24.32
4 (2, 2.95, 5.23, 8, 10) 32.13
5 (2, 2, 3.61, 6.44, 10) 42.78
To illustrate how to derive an optimal rule, consider example G(5, 2, 0.1).
In Table 1, we list for each s ∈ [0, 5] a locally optimal rule e∗s and the
corresponding value of EuC(e∗s). Since Eu
C(e∗5) > Eu
C(e∗s) for all s < 5, we
have an optimal rule e∗ = e∗5 = (2, 2, 3.61, 6.44, 10), and Eu
∗ = 42.78.
A careful observation of Table 1 also motivates the following property,
which partially describes how (locally) optimal rules look like. It also tell us
that if m(e∗) = n and no country makes any mistake, then each signatory’s
abatement level e∗(n) = nλ is socially optimal.
Proposition 2. If e∗s is locally optimal at s ≥ 1, then e∗s(1) = λ, e∗s(s) = sλ.
Proof. See the appendix.
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5 Comparison of rules
Now, we discuss some special rules commonly used in the literature and
compare them to the optimal rule e∗.
(a) A rule ea is called the MTP rule if it always aims to maximize the
total payoffs of all signatories, no matter which coalition M is formed.
Because of the symmetry of countries, we have m · uC(m, ea) ≥ m ·
uC(m, e′), or uC(m, ea) ≥ uC(m, e′), for all m ∈ [1, n] and all e′ ∈ R.
That is, ea maximizes uC(m, e), and thus ea(m) = λm, for all m ∈
[1, n].
(b) A rule eb is called a minimal participation rule (Ko¨ke and Lange, 2017)
if there exists m˜ ∈ [1, n] and q > λ, such that eb(m) = λ when 1 ≤
m < m˜, and eb(m) = q when m ≥ m˜. In other words, this rule
requires an abatement level q for signatories when at least m˜ countries
sign the IEA, while there is no requirement for signatories when less
than m˜ countries sign. In particular, if m˜ = n, eb is called a coalition
unanimity (CU) rule (Chander and Tulkens, 1997).
(c) A rule ec is called an MTP rule with minimal participation (Carraro
et al., 2009) if there exists m˜ ∈ [1, n], such that ec(m) = λ for all
1 ≤ m < m˜, and ec(m) = λm for all m ≥ m˜. Obviously, ec is a
combination of ea and eb. In particular, if m˜ = 1, ec is the MTP rule;
if m˜ = n, ec is a CU rule.
If there is a minimal participation rule eb∗ such that EuC(eb∗) ≥ EuC(eb′)
for all minimal participation rule eb
′
, then eb∗ is called an optimal minimal
participation rule. We can derive an optimal minimal participation rule eb∗
for any given game G(n, λ, ε) by the following algorithm. First, for any
integer s ∈ [1, n], choose q = q∗s to maximize EuC(eb) under constraint
m˜ = s, and get a corresponding rule eb∗s . Then, Eu
C(eb∗) is the maximal
value in {EuC(eb∗s ) | 1 ≤ s ≤ n}, and eb∗ can thus be found in {eb∗s | 1 ≤
s ≤ n}. Similarly, we can define and derive optimal MTP rule with minimal
participation ec∗ by choosing appropriate m˜. For example, consider game
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G(5, 2, 0.4). According to Table 2, we have eb∗ = (2, 2, 5.37, 5.37, 5.37),
EuC(eb∗) = 26.12; ec∗ = (2, 2, 2, 8, 10), EuC(ec∗) = 25.15.
Table 2: Calculating eb∗ and ec∗ for G(5, 2, 0.4)
m˜ = s q∗s m(e
b∗
s ) Eu
C(eb∗s ) m(ec∗s ) EuC(ec∗s )
1 2 5 18 3 20.59
2 3.23 4 20.89 3 20.59
3 5.37 5 26.12 4 23.10
4 8.46 5 25.03 5 25.15
5 10 5 20.49 5 20.49
Now we compare rules ea, eb∗ and ec∗ with optimal rule e∗. We first
consider an example G(5, 2, ε), and list the corresponding m(e) and EuC(e)
for ε ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9} in Table 3. For each ε in this table, the maximal
value of EuC(e), where e ∈ {ea, eb∗, ec∗} := R0, is highlighted in bold to show
which of the three rules is best for the designer. Moreover, let
η = max
e∈R0
EuC(e∗)− EuC(e)
EuC(e)
× 100
denote the percentage of payoff improvement of e∗ relative to the best rule
in R0. We list the values η in Table 3 to show at least how much better the
optimal rule can be than the other rules in R0.
Table 3: Simulation for G(5, 2, ε)
ea eb∗ ec∗ e∗
ε m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) η
0 3 26 5 50 5 50 5 50 0
0.1 3 24.32 5 36.90 5 36.90 5 42.78 15.93
0.2 3 22.86 5 35.20 5 35.86 5 36.88 2.84
0.3 3 21.63 5 29.63 5 29.86 5 32.02 7.23
0.4 3 20.59 5 26.12 5 25.15 5 28.03 7.31
0.5 4 21.88 5 23.88 5 24.31 5 24.79 1.97
0.6 4 20.38 5 21.38 5 21.55 5 22.22 3.11
0.7 5 20.26 5 19.79 5 20.26 5 20.26 0
0.8 5 18.94 5 18.82 5 18.94 5 18.94 0
0.9 5 18.22 5 18.20 5 18.22 5 18.22 0
18
In this example, we can see from Table 3 that ec∗ weakly dominates ea,
but neither eb∗ or ec∗ is dominated by each other. More interestingly, when
ε is zero, the CU rule eb∗ = ec∗ is optimal; when ε is large, the MTP rule
ea = ec∗ is optimal; when ε is positive but not too large, none of these three
rules in R0 is optimal. These outcomes can be explained as follows.
For the designer, a rule e has two important aspects that may affect
the value of the objective function EuC(e). On the one hand, the designer
wishes more countries to sign the IEA and that the signatories engage in a
high abatement level. Thus, the rule should provide for a strong incentive
for cooperation, or a strong punishment for free riding, by creating a large
payoff gap between signing and not signing. On the other hand, the designer
also wishes to reduce the harm that participation uncertainty brings on the
expected payoffs of signatories. This can be accomplished only by designing
a rule by which even when some countries do not sign the IEA due to mis-
takes, those signatories can still maintain a relatively high level of abatement,
leading to a small payoff gap between signing and not signing.
We call these two aspects of the rules as incentive effect and uncertainty
effect, respectively. A rule has a strong/weak incentive effect if it provides
strong/weak incentives for countries to cooperate; a rule has a strong/weak
uncertainty effect if a certain ε has a small/large impact on EuC(e).
These two effects are typically contradictory. A rule with a strong uncer-
tainty effect usually has a weak incentive effect. This is because any factor of
the rule protecting the signatories from harm caused by uncertainty will re-
quire those signatories to maintain a high level of abatement regardless of the
other countries’ mistakes. However, this requirement would also reduce the
incentive for cooperation. The designer faces a tradeoff between these two
conflicting effects. To design an appropriate rule under any specific situation,
the designer should evaluate the relative importance of the two effects.
From Table 3, when ε = 0 the optimal minimal participation rule eb∗,
which is currently a CU rule, is optimal. This is because this rule has a
strong incentive effect and weak uncertainty effect — even a very small un-
certainty will cause a huge loss on EuC(eb∗). However, the uncertainty effect
is irrelevant as ε = 0. Moreover, the next proposition shows that there is a
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CU rule that is “almost” optimal when uncertainty is sufficiently small.
Proposition 3. Suppose eb(n) = λn, eb(m) = λ for all m < n. For any
µ > 0, there exists γ > 0 such that when ε < γ, EuC(eb) > EuC(e′)− µ for
all e′ ∈ R.
Proof. It is obvious that m(eb) = n. Given any µ > 0, when ε is sufficiently
small, EuC(eb) =
∑n
k=0 b
(
k;n, 1 − ε)uC(k, eb) can be arbitrarily close to
uC(n, eb), and thus EuC(eb) > uC(n, eb) − µ. From (6), it is easy to verify
that uC(n, eb) ≥ uC(m, e′) for all m ≤ n and all e′. Hence, EuC(eb) >
uC(n, eb)− µ ≥∑m(e′)k=0 b(k;m(e′), 1− ε)uC(k, e′)− µ = EuC(e′)− µ.
In contrast, from Table 3, the MTP rule ea is an optimal rule only when
ε is large enough. This turns out to be a general outcome according to the
next proposition.
Proposition 4. When ε is sufficiently large, m(ea) = n, and ea is optimal.
Proof. See the appendix.
Intuitively, Proposition 4 holds because the MTP rule has a strong un-
certainty effect and a weak incentive effect, but the former is more important
when ε is large. The reason why ea has a strong uncertainty effect is, it re-
quires signatories to maintain a relatively high level of abatement so that the
joint payoff of M is maximized, even when m is small due to participation
uncertainty.
The fact that the MTP rule may not be optimal under small uncertainty
seems to be counterintuitive at first glance. Once a coalition M is formed, it
is quite natural to require all signatories to act as one player and maximize
their total payoffs. This explains why the MTP rule is so popular in the
coalition formation literature. However, a shortcoming of this rule is that it
has a weak incentive effect and hence may not effectively overcome the free
rider problem. Indeed, a reasonable rule should require the maximization of
corresponding payoff for only a stable coalition, rather than for all coalitions.
It is these latter redundant requirements that lead to a weak incentive effect
and undermine the MTP rule.
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There has been a debate regarding which one of the two rules, the MTP
rule (the noncooperative approach) or the CU rule (the cooperative ap-
proach), is more appropriate for an IEA.17 According to Proposition 3 and
4, the answer depends on the value of ε. For the designer, the MTP rule is
better than the CU rule when participation uncertainty is large enough —
that is, when uncertainty effect is more important than incentive effect.
From Table 3, the optimal MTP rule with minimal participation ec∗ al-
ways weakly dominates ea. This is obvious because ea is a special type of
ec. Moreover, according to Proposition 4 and Proposition 3, when ε is large
enough, ec∗(= ea) is optimal, while when ε is sufficiently small, ec∗(= eb∗) is
almost optimal. However, when ε is neither very large or very small, ec∗ may
be significantly away from optimal, and so do ea and eb∗.
A common problem with ea, eb∗ and ec∗ is, sometimes they are not flexible
enough to be an optimal rule. In particular, in our model setup, these rules
are somehow either constant or linear in m. For example, ea is linear in m;
eb∗ is a step function that is constant both when m < m˜ and when m ≥ m˜;
ec∗ is constant when m < m˜, and is linear in m when m ≥ m˜. By contrast,
the example in the previous section shows that e∗ need not be constant or
linear in m. Therefore, one advantage of e∗ is that it has more flexibility to
fully exploit the potential of attaining a larger value of EuC(e) when facing
the tradeoff between incentive effect and uncertainty effect.
Other than uncertainty parameter ε, we can also analyze the influence of
other parameters (n and λ) on the difference in signatories’s welfare between
optimal rule and other rules. When doing so, we are more interested in cases
when ε is fixed to a value that is positive but not very large so that e∗ is
typically strictly better than the other three rules in R0. In Table 4, we
consider example G(n, 2, 0.4) with 3 ≤ n ≤ 10. In Table 5, we study another
example G(5, λ, 0.4) with 0.5 ≤ λ ≤ 4. Note that in both examples, there is
no sign that η would converge to zero as n and λ becomes larger. Without a
rigorous analysis, these examples suggest that the advantage of e∗ over other
rules will probably remain to exist for arbitrary number of countries and any
value of marginal benefit from abatement.
17For example, see Tulkens (1998).
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Table 4: Simulation for G(n, 2, 0.4)
ea eb∗ ec∗ e∗
n m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) η
3 3 12.59 3 12.26 3 12.59 3 12.59 0
4 3 16.59 4 18.91 4 19.10 4 19.77 3.51
5 3 20.59 5 26.12 5 25.15 5 28.03 7.31
6 3 24.59 6 35.20 6 30.30 6 37.24 5.79
7 3 28.59 7 42.59 7 42.91 7 47.29 10.21
8 3 32.59 8 54.11 8 48.55 8 58.13 7.43
9 3 36.59 9 63.90 9 52.83 9 69.70 9.08
10 3 40.59 10 74.73 9 56.83 10 81.97 9.69
Table 5: Simulation for G(5, λ, 0.4)
ea eb∗ ec∗ e∗
λ m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) η
0.5 3 1.29 5 1.63 5 1.57 5 1.75 7.36
1.0 3 5.15 5 6.53 5 6.29 5 7.01 7.35
1.5 3 11.58 5 14.69 5 14.15 5 15.77 7.35
2.0 3 20.59 5 26.12 5 25.15 5 28.03 7.31
2.5 3 32.18 5 40.81 5 39.30 5 43.80 7.33
3.0 3 46.33 5 58.77 5 56.60 5 63.07 7.32
3.5 3 63.01 5 79.99 5 77.03 5 85.84 7.31
4.0 3 82.37 5 104.47 5 100.62 5 112.12 7.32
6 Conclusion
In this study, we introduce a three-stage coalition formation game to endoge-
nously determine IEA rules that are dependent on the number of signatories
under participation uncertainty. We provide an algorithm to derive a rule
that is optimal in the sense of maximizing the expected payoff of signatories.
Part of the past failures of IEAs can be attributed to the use of non-optimal
rules, especially when the participation uncertainty is positive but not very
large. In particular, the MTP rule has a weak incentive effect and is not
optimal unless participation uncertainty is very large; the CU rule has a very
weak uncertainty effect and is not optimal as long as there exists participation
uncertainty. The main policy implication of our findings is that a good IEA
rule should be flexible enough to reach a balance between providing sufficient
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incentive for cooperation and reducing the losses caused by uncertainty.
Some further works and extensions may be worth studying in future re-
search. First, by now we know little about the properties of optimal rules.
For instance, an open question is under what conditions are optimal rules
ex ante efficient in the sense that they result in full participation and in-
duce socially optimal abatement level before uncertainty is realized; that is,
m(e∗) = n and e∗(n) = nλ.18 This question is important, because its answer
shows when we can be more optimistic about what IEAs can accomplish.
Second, our analysis has taken advantage of the simple model setups
such as homogenous countries and simple payoff function. We can study
models with more general settings, for example, with heterogenous countries.
Along with the extension of heterogenous countries, we may further study
more complex IEA rules. For example, a rule may contain an abatement
function e(M) assigning a country-specific abatement level for signatories,
and a transfer function t(M) characterizing the money transferred among
signatories.
Third, some other objectives of the designer can be studied. For instance,
sometimes it makes more sense to assume that the designer will maximize
expected social welfare rather than the signatories’ welfare.
Finally, note that in addition to the IEA issue, the MTP rule is widely ap-
plied in some other areas involving the voluntary provision of goods with ex-
ternalities, such as cartel formation in oligopoly markets (d’Aspremont et al.,
1983; Donsimoni et al., 1986), cooperation in R&D (Katz, 1986; Poyago-
Theotoky, 1995), and sharing natural resource (Miller and Nkuiya, 2016).
In a typical application, players first decide whether to join a coalition, and
then all coalition members act according to the MTP rule. However, in most
of these works, participation uncertainty is implicitly assumed to be zero,
which implies that the MTP rule may not always be an appropriate rule.19
Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to re-examine the outcome of these
works by endogenizing the choice of the coalition rules.
18Because of Proposition 2, we only need to know when m(e∗) = n holds.
19See Mao (2018) for a criticism of the MTP rule without participation uncertainty.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(a) From (16), R(s) is obviously a closed set in Rs+ for each s ∈ [1, n].
(b) Now, we prove that R(s) is a bounded set in Rs+ by induction on s. We
can easily see that R(1) = {λ} is bounded in R1+. Assume inductively that
R(k) is bounded in Rk+, 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1. That is, there exist T1, T2, . . . , Tk > 0,
such that for each
(
e(1), . . . , e(k)
) ∈ R(k): e(q) < Tq, 1 ≤ q ≤ k.
Now, consider R(k+1). According to (16), for each
(
e(1), . . . , e(k+1)
) ∈
R(k + 1), we have e(q) < Tq, 1 ≤ q ≤ k. Additionally, e(k + 1) satisfies
uC(k + 1, e) ≥ uI(k, e); that is,
−1
2
e(k + 1)2 + a(k + 1)e(k + 1) + A(k) > 0,
where A(k) depends on
(
e(1), . . . , e(k)
)
. Thus, e(k + 1) is also bounded,
implying that R(k + 1) is bounded in Rk+1+ . Consequently, R(s) is bounded
in Rs+ for each s ∈ [1, n].
(c) It remains to prove that R(s) is not empty. Given s ∈ [1, n], we
can construct
(
eˆ(1), . . . , eˆ(s)
)
as follows: (n1) eˆ(s) = λs; (n2) eˆ(k) = λ,
∀k ∈ [1, s− 1].
For any m < n and any rule e, we have
uC(m+ 1, e)− uI(m, e)
=(1− ε)
m∑
k=0
b(k;m, 1− ε) [uC(k + 1, e)− uI(k, e)] . (19)
Note that from (n2), uC(k + 1, eˆ) − uI(k, eˆ) = 0, k ∈ [1, s − 2]; from (n1)
and (n2), uC(s, eˆ) − uI(s − 1, eˆ) = 1
2
λ2(s − 1)2 ≥ 0. Hence, from (19),
uC(m + 1, eˆ) ≥ uI(m, eˆ), m ∈ [0, s − 1]. Therefore, (eˆ(1), . . . , eˆ(s)) ∈ R(s),
which implies R(s) 6= ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2.
e∗s(1) = λ is obviously true since otherwise we have u
C(1, e∗s) < u
I(0, e∗s),
which contradicts e∗s ∈ E(s). It remains to prove e∗s(s) = sλ. Given s ∈ [1, n],
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suppose for a contradiction that e∗s(s) 6= sλ. Let e′s be a rule such that
e′s(k) = e
∗
s(k) for all k < s, e
′
s(s) = sλ, and when s < n, e
′
s(s + 1) be large
enough so that uC(s+ 1, e′s) < u
I(s, e′s).
20
Since uC(k, e′s) = u
C(k, e∗s) for all k < s, u
C(s, e∗s) = λ[se
∗
s(s)+(1−s)λ]−
1
2
e∗s(s)
2 < 1
2
λ2(s2−2s+2) = uC(s, e′s), we have uC(s, e′s) > uC(s, e∗s) ≥ uI(s−
1, e∗s) = u
I(s−1, e′s), and uC(k, e′s) = uC(k, e∗s) ≥ uI(k−1, e∗s) = uI(k−1, e′s)
for all k < s. Additionally, uC(s+ 1, e′s) < u
I(s, e′s). These imply e
′
s ∈ E(s).
Moreover, EuC(e′s) =
∑s
k=0 b
(
k; s, 1 − ε)uC(k, e′s) > ∑sk=0 b(k; s, 1 −
ε
)
uC(k, e∗s) = Eu
C(e∗s), which contradicts e
∗
s is locally optimal at s. This
implies e∗s(s) = sλ.
Proof of Proposition 4.
From the definition of ea, we have
uC(m, ea)− uI(m− 1, ea) = −1
2
λ2(m− 1)(m− 3) =

= 0, if m = 1, 3
> 0, if m = 2
< 0, if 3 < m ≤ n
(20)
When ε is very large, we have
b
(
0;m, 1− ε) b(1;m, 1− ε) · · ·  b(m;m, 1− ε), ∀m ≤ n, (21)
where means “far greater than”. From (19), (20) and (21), it follows that
uC(m+ 1, ea)− uI(m, ea) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ [0, n− 1]. Hence, m(ea) = n.
Suppose rule e0 is optimal and m(e0) = n, then e0(1) maximizes uC(1, e).
Otherwise, we can find e′ such that uC(1, e′) > uC(1, e0). Hence, from (15)
and (21), EuC(e′) > EuC(e0), which contradicts e0 is optimal. Assume
inductively that e0(k) maximizes uC(k, e) for each k ∈ [1,m], where m < n.
If e0 is optimal for a sufficiently large ε, e0(k+1) also maximizes uC(k+1, e).
Otherwise, let e′ be such that e′(s) = e0(s), s ≤ k, and uC(k + 1, e′) >
uC(k+ 1, e0). From (15) and (21), this implies that EuC(e′) > EuC(e0), and
contradicts the assumption that e0 is optimal.
If m(e0) = s < n, we can show that EuC(e0) < EuC(ea) for a sufficiently
20Recall that in the proof of Theorem 1, we have shown that such e′s(s+1) can be found.
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large ε, and thus e0 cannot be optimal. We only have to consider the case
when e0 is locally optimal at s. Repeating the reasoning process in the
previous paragraph, we know that e0(k) maximizes uC(k, e) for any k ∈
[1, s]. Otherwise, we can find e′ ∈ R(s) such that EuC(e0) < EuC(e′), which
contradicts the assumption that e0 is locally optimal at s. This implies that
e0 = ea, for all k ≤ s. Also note that uC(k, ea) is increasing in k, hence∑s
k=0
[
b
(
k; s, 1 − ε) − b(k;n, 1 − ε)]uC(k, e0) ≈ [b(0; s, 1 − ε) − b(0;n, 1 −
ε
)]
uC(0, e0) <
[
b
(
0; s, 1− ε)− b(0;n, 1− ε)]uC(s+ 1, ea) ≈∑sk=0 [b(k; s, 1−
ε
)−b(k;n, 1−ε)]uC(s+1, ea) = ∑nk=s+1 b(k;n, 1−ε)uC(s+1, ea), where “≈”
hold because ε is very large. Thus, EuC(ea) =
∑n
k=0 b
(
k;n, 1−ε)uC(k, ea) =∑s
k=0 b
(
k; s, 1− ε)uC(k, e0)−∑sk=0 [b(k; s, 1− ε)− b(k;n, 1− ε)]uC(k, e0) +∑n
k=s+1 b
(
k;n, 1− ε)uC(k, ea) > EuC(e0) +∑nk=s+1 b(k;n, 1− ε)[uC(k, ea)−
uC(s+ 1, ea)
] ≥ EuC(e0).
Thus, we have proved that if e0 is optimal when ε is large enough, then
e0(k) maximizes uC(k, e) for any k ∈ [1, n], which implies that e0 = ea. That
is, ea is optimal when ε is sufficiently large.
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